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by James  G.  Hoehn 
Introduction 
A frequent criticism directed at many macroeco- 
nomic models, especially those with wage stick- 
iness, concerns their inability to account for the 
procyclical pattern of real wages. This article 
offers a resolution of this problem by introduc- 
ing productivity factors into the determination of 
sticky wages. This resolution makes the resulting 
model more consistent with standard microeco- 
nomic theory about the determination of wages. 
The problem of accounting for real-wage cycli- 
city arises both for sticky-wage models such as 
those of Keynes (1936) and Fischer (1977), and 
for the incomplete-information models such as 
those of Friedman (1968) and Lucas and Rapping 
(1969). Economists favoring these models have 
offered a wide variety of  prospective solutions to 
the puzzle of real-wage cyclicity, including com- 
plex reinterpretation of the evidence and a variety 
of  modifications to the models. However, none 
of  these solutions has been widely accepted and 
the failure of  proponents of these models to 
resolve the real-wage puzzle has been consid- 
ered a serious shortcoming of the models. 
The inability of  existing sticky-wage and 
incomplete-information models to account for 
the cyclicity of  the real wage has given impetus 
to the development of  two alternative ex- 
planations of macroeconomic fluctuations. These 
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alternatives are capable of resolving the real- 
wage puzzle, but have problems of their own. 
First, the real-business-cycle  approach explains 
economic fluctuations without invoking sticky 
wages or prices or incomplete information: 
employment, output, wages, and prices are deter- 
mined by people's informed responses to vary- 
ing productive opportunities.  Real wages will 
generally be procyclical in such models, reflect- 
ing the variations in factor productivity that drive 
the real business cycle. Indeed, real-business- 
cycle models can easily generate implausibly 
high real-wage cyclicity.'  The real-business-cycle 
approach also cannot account for the observed 
effects of money supply changes on real activity? 
and provides no guidance for monetaty policy. 
Second, the real-wage puzzle has redirected 
many Keynesians away from wage rigidities and 
toward commodity price rigidities or monopolis- 
tic price-setting behavior. The sticky-price mod- 
els, like the sticky-wage models, can account for 
1  See  Christiano and  Eichenbaum (1988). 
2  But see King and Plosser (1986), which attributes the observed relation 




Best available copythe effect of policy on activity. For example, if 
suppliers accommodate the demand at sticky 
prices, and the real demand for goods depends 
on real-money balances, then increases in 
demand due to monetary expansion are met by 
increases in output. If  the nominal wage is flexi- 
ble, such an increase in output will raise the 
demand for labor, raising both the nominal and 
the real wage. Variations in demand within a 
sticky-price, flexible-wage model are thus able to 
generate procyclical variations in the real wage. 
The argument here is that there is no necessity 
to reject the notion of a sticky wage on account 
of the real-wage puzzle; a more conservative 
solution exists in the introduction of productivity 
shocks into the determination of the sticky wage. 
However, sticky-wage models are subject to 
some criticism on more theoretical lines. They 
have the problem of explaining why firms and 
workers would agree to f~ wages for a period in 
nominal terms and then allow the quantity of 
employment to be determined by the firm's 
labor demand at that wage.3 The objection that 
sticky-wage models result in nonoptimal 
employment determination has prompted 
Keynesians to endeavor to understand how con- 
straints on the feasibility of ideal contracts, such 
as problems of information, contract enforce- 
ment, or transaction costs, prevent firms and 
workers from determining employment and 
output in an ideal manner. The sticky-wage 
model would be more explicitly consistent with 
microeconomic theory and might be more useful 
for understanding and controlling the business 
cycle if  it made these constraints explicit. 
But essentially the same issue can be raised 
concerning sticky-price models: what constraints 
would lead sellers to fix a commodity's price in 
nominal terms and allow quantity to be deter- 
mined by the demand at that price? 4, 
Thus, the theoretical arguments against sticky- 
3  Ideally,  output and employment should be determined by the condition 
that the marginal disutility of work equals the marginal product of labor. See 
Hall (1980), Hall and Lilien (1979), and Barro (1977). 
4  Akedof and Yellen (1985a,  1985b, 1988) provide a parlial answer to 
this problem, by showing how small discrepancies of individual behavior from 
full, explicit rationality-discrepancies associated with sticky prices and 
wages-can be  consistent with large departures of aggregate activity from 
optimal levels. McCallum (1986) couples this idea that there are small pivate 
costs associated with sticky wages and vices with the notion of menu costs, 
or expenses incurred by changing price lists, to anive at an economic theory of 
stickiness. A final and more difficult requirement of a completely explicit theory 
of  stickiness, as playing an effective role in economic fluctuations, is a ratio- 
nale for quantity determination at the sticky wage or  pice.  This requirement is 
imporlant, because economists such as Barro (1977) have conjectured that 
sticky prices or wages may not have any effects on  allocation, but may 
instead be a facade for optimal quantity determination. 
wage models do not compel their abandonment 
in favor of alternatives, returning the focus to the 
empirical arguments against sticky-wage models. 
The crucial issue separating different views about 
the source and policy implications of macroeco- 
nomic fluctuations is whether the real-wage puz- 
zle can be resolved without abandoning sticky 
wages as part of the explanation of the business 
cycle. Economists have increasingly come to 
view the puzzle as fatally damaging to sticky- 
wage models. For example, Mankiw (1987, p. 
105), concludes the case against them by saying 
"...perhaps [the] most serious  ...p  roblem with the 
unadorned nominal wage story is that real wages 
do not move over the business cycle as the the- 
ory predicts  ...." Likewise, McCallum (1986, p. 
408) claims that "  [i]  f wage stickiness alone was 
responsible for the real effects of monetary 
actions, with product prices adjusting flexibly, 
then we should observe countercyclical move- 
ments in the real wage." 
This article offers a reconciliation of sticky 
wages with observed cyclical behavior of real 
wages by introducing productivity factors into 
nominal-wage contracts. It shows that sticky 
nominal wages can be consistent with the pro- 
cyclical real wages of the United States-even if 
prices are perfectly flexible-under quite reason-  i 
able conditions: wage bargains reflect expected 
labor productivity, productivity variations are 
persistent and procyclical, and aggregate demand 
fluctuations are not too large relative to produc- 
tivity fluctuations. 
The introduction of productivity factors into 
the determination of nominal wages is most 
readily accomplished within a wage-contracting 
setup like Fischer's (1977), and so a modifica- 
tion of his approach will be used here.6 All con- 
sidered, it is worthwhile to attempt to modify 
sticky-wage theories to make them consistent 
with procyclical real wages. A successful attempt 
yields a model consistent with orthodox macro- 
economic theory, with the important stylized 
facts of U.S. business cycles? and with the 
microeconomics that links wages to productivity. 
Furthermore, the model is able to provide guid- 
ance to monetary policymakers about the effects 
of monetay policy. 
5  A more symmetric treatment of  these issues would allow for both 
wage and price stickiness as part  of a complete model.  Price stickiness can, 
as explained in the text, help to resolve the real-wage puzzle. The  argument 
that sticky wages are consistent with procyclical real wages is stronger for not 
relying on price stickiness. If procyclical real wages can be generated in a 
model economy without sticky prices then, a fortiori, so much more easily can 
a procyclical real  wage be  generated when price stickiness is allowed. 
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Important Role in 
Keynesian Models 
At  least since the Keynesian revolution, sticky 
wages have played a prominent role in macroeco- 
nomic theories of the interaction between prices 
and quantities, providing an explanation of a 
number of stylized facts of the business cycle, 
particularly the tendency of employment to 
increase with inflation caused by demand stimula- 
tion, such as increases in the money supply. 
Keynes (1936, chapter 2) formalized the sticky- 
wage mechanism linking money and prices to 
output and employment. A decrease in the money 
supply lowers the price level, raising the real 
wage at the fixed nominal wage, forcing an 
employment-contracting movement along a fured 
real demand for labor schedule. Keynes assumed 
that the real-labor-demand schedule was identi- 
cal to the marginal-productivity-of-labor  schedule. 
More recent sticky-wage models account for 
the eventual adjustment of money wages to price 
level variations. Wages must eventually adjust 
one-for-one with prices, ruling out money illu- 
sion. For example, price deflation will eventually 
lead to lower nominal wages. Because of the 
unemployment caused by price deflation and 
the associated rise in the real wage, a firm can 
find workers willing to work for less than the 
initial money wage. But collective bargaining 
and other conventions concerning compensation 
make it difficult for money wages to decline as 
rapidly as prices can fall. Typically, nominal 
wages remain stuck until scheduled, periodic 
renegotiations are undertaken. 
6  Productivity factors could be introduced into wage determination in 
other models, such as the incomplete-information  models mentioned. This mod. 
ification could make them consistent with procyclical real wages, although this 
improvement would not satisfy other objections to them. Among the objec- 
tions to incomplete-information models is that information lags in reality are 
too short  to account for persistent macroeconomic fluctuations. The business 
fluctuations to be accounted for by a business-cycle theory have a duration of 
years, while delays of  information available to people is at most a few 
months, aside from statistical revisions; money supply data are available 
within a few weeks. The  gap in the frequencies of  cause and effect is sus- 
pect. Also, in incomplete-information models that involve intertemporal substi- 
tution like those of  Lucas and Barro, positive output effects of money shocks 
are hard to reconcile with reasonable microeconomic assumptions. Barro, 
Grossman and King (1984) confess that it is difficult to specify a plausible set 
of assumptions concerning the nature of utility functions, capital depreciation 
and correlations of shocks that is consistent with a positive relation in 
incomplete-information models; it is easier to specify assumptions that lead to 
no relation or a negative one! Even if Keynesian sticky-wage theory lacks the 
explicit individual rationality of  the incomplete-information theories, it is at least 
capable of  generating the stylized facts that increases in money generate per- 
sistent and positively related changes in inflation and in output growth. 
Keynes' analysis was a short-run or period 
analysis, in which wages were taken as histori- 
cally given. Newer Keynesian sticky-wage models 
make the wage decisions of workers and firms 
respond to events and expectations of future 
events. Current wages in newer models are 
influenced by economic conditions; wages are 
predetermined, not exogenous.8 
The emphasis on long-term contracts in new 
sticky-wage models has been accompanied by 
increased attention to expectation formation. As 
Taylor (1983, p. 63) says, "...long-term relation- 
ships do  not diminish the importance of expec- 
tations in macroeconomic analysis. On the con- 
trary, expectations of the future significantly 
affect the terms of contractual arrangements. 
They are of greater quantitative importance in 
contractual situations than they are in more flex- 
ible auction-market situations." Recognition of 
the role of forward-looking expectations about 
productivity thus seems well in the spirit of the 
new genre of wage-contracting models. 
11.  The Puzzle of  the 
Procyclical  Real Wage 
Keynesians originally attempted to explain the 
fluctuations in output and employment strictly 
by variations in aggregate demand. This 
approach ruled out or abstracted fiom techno- 
logical change, and is associated with a fured 
marginal product of labor schedule. It follows 
that the real wage will be negatively related to 
employment and, in this sense, is necessarily 
countercyclical. In the words of Keynes (1936, p. 
17), "...an increase in employment can occur 
only through the accompaniment of a decline in 
real wages. Thus, I am not disputing this vital fact 
7  Stylized facts of  the  U.S. economy with which a successful macroeco- 
nomic model should be consistent include the following: (i) A short-run Phillips 
curve: Changes in aggregate demand generate a positive relation between 
output (and employment) and inflation. For example, large increases in the 
money supply,  which increase aggregate demand, are associated with high 
inflation and high output increases. (ii) Supply shocks generate a negative rela- 
tion between output and inflation. For  example, an increase in the price of 
imported oil is associated with high inflation and below-normal output growth. 
(iii) Long-run vertical Phillips curve (natural-rate hypothesis): regular increases 
in aggregate demand and/or prices are anticipated and leave output and 
employment unaffected. (iv) Output and employment display persistent devia- 
tions from normal levels in the face of  both demand and supply shocks. (v) 
Wages are institutionally sticky-more so than commodity prices. (vi) Real 
wages display a modest positive correlation with both output and employment. 
(vii) Output per worker-hour is mildly procyclical. 
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asserted as indefea~ible."~ 
Although a fured marginal-product-of-labor 
schedule necessarily implies that real wages are 
negatively correlated with employment, it remains 
possible, albeit unlikely, for real wages to be posi- 
tively correlated with output, if the productivity 
of nonlabor factors of production varies. For exam- 
ple, an increase in the productivity  of fured factors 
would increase output, lowering the price level 
for a given money supply, raising the real wage, 
and inducing a contraction of employment along 
the fured marginal-product-of-labor schedule. 
Shocks of this kind would tend to make the real 
wage procyclical as measured against output, but 
countercyclical as measured against employment. 
But while nonlabor productivity may vary, it is 
unlikely to do so independently of labor produc- 
tivity. For example, a new wave of technology, 
say, low-cost personal computers, might raise the 
productivity of capital but ought to raise the pro- 
ductivity of labor simultaneously. In many empir- 
ical and theoretical studies, the production func- 
tion is specified in such a way that labor and 
other factors are subject to equal proportional 
productivity shocks. 
In any case, the introduction of independent 
variations in the productivity of nonlabor factors 
cannot be much relied upon to enhance the 
sticky-wage model's conformity with the stylized 
facts of the business cycle. Such variations do not 
provide a mechanism for a positive real- 
wage/employment correlation and tend to create 
a counterfactual negative correlation between 
output and employment. Hence, it seems 
unlikely that independent variations in nonlabor 
factor productivity are of great enough impor- 
tance to reverse the presumption that a sticky 
wage and a fxed marginal-product-of-labor 
schedule will generate a countercyclical real 
wage, whether the measure of the business cycle 
is employment or output. 
W  9  Like the classical economists he criticized, Keynes never seemed to 
question the idea that labor was an input of fixed quality, whose productivity 
was determined by iron laws of  technology. The concept of labor as a homo- 
geneous physical input whose productivity is subject to rigid technological law 
is not taken as seriously by today's economists as it was by British ecmo- 
mists from Malthus and Ricardo to Keynes. A better understanding of  labor is 
a skilled attention to purposive activity, whose marginal value to an employer 
is influenced by innumerable social and cultural conditions, such as the 
weather, science, art, religion, politics, various international tensions, demo- 
graphic and epidemic events, and other institutional and historical factors. The 
production function and the marginal product-of-labw  schedule are useful am- 
lytical devices subsuming the influence of all of these factors. But it is prepos- 
terous to insist that they remain frozen and do not cmlribute to macroeco- 
nomic fluctuations. 
Unfortunately for Keynes' theory, real wages 
have not been countercyclical  as predicted.10 The 
literature on the behavior of real wages over the 
business cycle is large, controversial,  and defies 
simple summary. The behavior of aggregate real- 
wage measures over the business cycle has been 
found to reflect changes in the composition of 
employed labor as well as changes in the real 
wage received by a representative worker. These 
factors are difficult to disentangle. Lucas (1970) 
attempted to resolve the real-wage puzzle by 
showing that aggregation over straight and over- 
time pay rates masks an underlying real-wage 
countercyclicity. On the other hand, aggregation 
of young and experienced workers has been 
found to bias downward the measured cyclicity 
of the real wage." By now it is probably the 
consensus that, for the postwar US., real wages 
for a representative worker are mildly procyclical 
or at least acyclical. This unambiguously negates 
the Keynesian prediction; the real-wage anomaly 
arises even if the real wage merely fails to be 
countercyclical.  Some of the most important 
recent studies leading to this conclusion are 
Bodkin (1969), Mitchell, et a1.(1985), and Bils 
(1985). Rayack (1987) offers a balanced and 
fairly comprehensive bibliography of empirical 
studies on the cyclical behavior of real wages. 
As the mild procyclicity or acyclicity of the real 
wage became regarded as a robust empirical 
result, economists responded with a wide range 
of proposed solutions to the real-wage puzzle- 
a range that is a monument to the inventiveness 
of the profession. Among the responses are 
monopoly or oligopoly pricing models (Keynes 
[1939],  Modigliani [1977], and Okun [I9811  ); 
allowance for prices being stickier than wages 
(Blanchard [  19861, and McCallum [I9861  ); the 
general disequilibrium model (Barro and 
Grossman [I9761  );  Lucasian capital dynamics or 
Blinder inventory dynamics (both suggested by 
Leiderman [I9831  ); retaining the sticky wage but 
making prices equal to a markup over wages, 
which makes the real wage essentially  acyclical by 
assumption (as in Taylor  [1979a, 1979b, 19801 ); 
rejecting the notion of sticky wages as relevant to 
the U.S. business cycle (as have partisans of the 
real-business-cycle approach); or, most radically, 
rejecting neoclassical economics in favor of 
Ricardian or Marxian theory (Schor [ 19851  ). 
10  Keynes (1936) predicted, on  the basis of  the sticky-wage model, that 
changes in real wages and money wages would be negatively correlated. Dun- 
lop (1938) and Tarshis (1939) presented contrary evidence,  evoking Keynes' 
(1939) reply. 
11  See, for example, Mitchell, et al. (1985). 
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those of economists favoring sticky-wage mod- 
els, will appear contrived or opportunistic, dis- 
turbing an idealized conception of scientific 
method. Okun confesses that "[wlith a sufficient 
display of ingenuity, a 'quasi-Keynesian' [sticky- 
wage] model can be concocted that is consistent 
with the cyclical facts on productivity, real wages, 
and factor shares  ....  These analytical pyrotechnics 
really illustrate that anything goes under condi- 
tions of 
However, ad hoc solutions are common and 
useful elements of scientific practice. "  [W]  ithin 
what Kuhn calls 'normal science'-puzzle- 
solving-  [scientists] use the same banal and 
obvious methods all of us use in every human 
activity. They check off examples against criteria; 
they fudge the counter-examples enough to 
avoid the need for new models; they try out var- 
ious guesses, formulated within the current jar- 
gon, in the hope of coming up with something 
which will cover the unfudgeable cases."l3 The 
real-wage puzzle increasingly seems to be an 
unfudgeable counterexample calling for some 
modification of the sticky-wage model. My  guess 
of what can cover the unfudgeable case without 
abandoning sticky wages is formulated in the 
jargon of production functions and productivity 
shocks, recently made current in macroeconom- 
ics by real-business-cycle theorists. 
It is certainly remarkable that the productivity 
solution to the real-wage puzzle has not, appar- 
ently, been explored before. However, a recent 
contribution by Leiderman (1983, p. 77) came 
close: "...the relationship between real wages 
and economic activity to be found in a given 
sample of data is likely to depend on the specific 
real and monetary shocks that affected the econ- 
omy during the sample period. For example, it 
seems quite plausible that the specific pattern of 
wages/activity comovement emerging during 
periods of important productivity (or technol- 
ogy) shocks would sharply differ from that aris- 
ing during monetary cycles." Leiderman found 
evidence that real wages declined in response to 
unanticipated money growth, generating a coun- 
tercyclical pattern, if  the oil shocks of the seven- 
ties, a kind of productivity shock, are controlled 
for with dummy variables. Thus, Leiderman 
approaches, but does not actually arrive at, an 
explicit recognition that shifts in the productivity 
12  See Okun  (1981), p.  19. 
13  See  Rorty (1982), p.  572. 
of labor (other than those associated with capital 
or inventory responses to money surprises) 
could generate procyclical real wages, consistent 
with declining returns to labor. 
Keynesians favoring sticky-wage models may 
have overlooked or sometimes even dismissed 
the productivity solution to the real-wage puzzle 
because of doubt that autonomous variations in 
labor productivity are important in the business 
cycle. Literature in the real-business-cycle genre 
has made the notion of productivity shocks 
appear useful in accounting for procyclicity in 
real wages. But this does not motivate a rejection 
of sticky-wage models, which can incorporate 
productivity shocks. 
Ill. A  Formal Wage- 
Contracting Model 
This section reconciles the Keynesian real-wage 
mechanism with the stylized fact of mildly pro- 
cyclical real wages by extending Fischer's (1977) 
model, in which nominal wages are negotiated 
in light of expectations of inflation. The exten- 
sion involves persistent or autocorrelated shifts 
in the marginal-product-of-labor schedule, as 
plotted against the level of employment, which 
are taken into account in setting wages. 
For example, a positive innovation in labor 
productivity raises expectations of future produc- 
tivity because high productivity tends to persist. 
Firms and workers bargaining over nominal 
wages for the periods to come will take account 
of the higher expected productivity. In particular, 
money wages will be set at the expectation of 
the marginal product of labor (at a targeted 
employment level) times the price level. This 
theory is well within the spirit of Keynes' sticky- 
wage model, but also embodies the neoclassical 
notion that wages reflect expectations of produc- 
tivity as well as expectations of inflation. 
This amendment to the Keynesian sticky-wage 
mechanism can easily account for a real wage 
that is positively correlated with output. Consider 
separately the effect of demand and productivity 
shocks. An aggregate demand shock changes 
output and the real wage in opposite directions. 
A productivity shock changes output and real 
wages in the same direction. In an economy sub- 
ject to both kinds of shocks, if supply shocks are 
important, and if wage bargainers are adroit at 
adjusting money wages to keep them in line 
with the expected marginal revenue product of 
labor, it is easy for an overall pattern of mildly 
positive correlation between output and real 
wages to arise. 
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positive correlation between employment and 
the real wage. In order to do  so, productivity 
shocks must have important positive effects on 
employment. This is difficult because initially, 
increased productivity, by raising output, reduces 
the price level and raises the real wage at the 
contract wage. The rise in the real wage reduces 
the incentive of a firm to expand employment. 
When a contract is subsequently renegotiated, 
the real wage can be adjusted downward 
(though it will remain above the level occurring 
prior to the productivity improvement). This 
downward adjustment in the real wage can pro- 
vide for expanded employment and is therefore 
consistent with a preference among workers for 
more employment at a temporarily high real 
wage. A critical part of the mechanism for gener- 
ating a positive relation between the real wage 
and employment under sticky wages is this 
desire of workers to increase expected employ- 
ment under renegotiated contracts as the 
expected real wage under the contract rises. 
In the rest of this section, a formal model is 
developed that is similar to Fischer's (1977), but 
which incorporates productivity shocks and 
explicit profit-maximization by firms. The supply 
behavior of firms implies a kind of Phillips curve 
(equation 13 below) in which output supply 
responds both to unbargained-for inflation and 
to productivity. The model is completed with a 
velocity equation (16) and a money-supply feed- 
back policy rule (17), and solutions for output, 
employment, and real wages derived (18,19,20). 
In the next section, the model here developed is 
used to resolve the real-wage puzzle. 
Following Fischer (1977), consider a hypo- 
thetical economy with two-period staggered, or 
overlapping, contracts. The economy is com- 
posed of two groups of firms, identical in all 
respects, except for the date at which currently 
effective labor contracts were signed. Firms hav- 
ing signed wage contracts at the end of last 
period (t  -1) are referred to as group-one firms, 
while those that signed wage contracts at the 
end of the period before last (t  -2) are referred 
to as group-two firms. The groups are competi- 
tive in that they take the commodity price as 
given. Economy-wide aggregates are simulated 
by taking the average of the two groups. 
The firms' production function is 
where Yt is the output of a firm in group i in 
period t, N,  is the labor input of a firm in group 
i, and Z is a global productivity shock. The mar- 
ginal product of labor is 
In logarithmic form, output is 
where the lowercase letters y, z, and n are natu- 
ral logarithms of their uppercase counterparts. 
The (log of the) marginal product of labor is 
''it 
(4)  In ( -)  = zt  +  In (y)+(y-l)nit, 
'Nit 
The demand for labor by firm i in period t, rift, 
is given by the condition that the real wage 
equals the marginal product of labor: 
where wit is the (log of the) wage received by 
group i firms' workers in period t, and p is the 
(log of the) price level. The notional (in the 
sense of Clower [I9651  ) supply of labor to a 
firm is conditioned on the real-wage rate: 
If wages were not sticky, but varied to clear 
the market, they would equal w *it,  the labor 
market clearing wage, or the wage for which 
labor demand equals the notional labor supply, 
n$  = nit: 
(7)  w:,  = Pt +  [In (y)  - (1 -Y)P~I  J + JZt, 
where J=  [l+P1(l  -?)I-'. 
The contractual wage rate is the expectation of 
the rate that would clear the labor market. The 
contract wage for group i is found by taking the 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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available in period t - i , when the contract was 
signed. 
where Et - ,  is the operator that conditions random 
variables on realizations at t - i and earlier. 
Finally, let zt be a first-order autoregressive 
process, 
These elements are sufficient to specify the 
supply sector of the economy, under the 
assumption that labor input is demand- 
determined: 
Using (3),  (5),  (8), (91, and (101, it can be shown 
that the (log of the) output of group one is 
and the output of group two is 
Equation (13) provides a characterization of the 
supply sector of the economy. It can be thought 
of.= a kind of Phillips curve: the equation shows 
that output depends on inflation not expected 
when contracts were signed and on productivity 
shocks, with coefficients that depend uniquely 
on the elasticity of output with respect to labor 
input, y,  and on the elasticity of  notional labor 
supply, PI 
It is useful to compare and contrast the modi- 
fied Fischer supply equation, (13), with the orig- 
inal Fischer supply equation, which was based 
on the assumption that wage-setters seek to sta- 
bilize the real wage. In order to see the differ- 
ence clearly, rewrite (13) as 
1 - YJ  where a = - 
1-Y 
where b = A 
2(1 - Y) 
where c =  y  [Po  + Plln (Y)]J. 
Total output for the economy (taken as the aver- 
age across firm groups) is 
The parameter a shows the elasticity of the 
response of output to productivity variations, 
once wages adjust. The parameter b shows the 
extra output response of each group of firms that 
occurs prior to recontracting, reflecting the advan- 
tage employers take of productivity advances not 
yet reflected in wages. Both groups of firms are 
in a position to take such advantage in the cur- 
rent period of a supply shock, but group-one 
firms have already recontracted to reflect shocks 
in period t - 1. These considerations explain 
why the parameter b is doubled in the E, - term, 
why it appears singly in the 6, -  - term, and 
why it does not enter in the €-terms of longer 
lags. Of course, productivity shocks can also 
influence output indirectly through their influ- 
ence on price surprises. 
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with Fischer's original: 
There are two minor differences in output 
supply behavior implied by (14) as opposed to 
(15). First, the modified equation has terms for 
productivity shocks, the cs  ,  that can be repres- 
ented as an ARMA(1,2) process, while the origi- 
nal Fischer equation has productivity shock 
terms that can be represented as an AR( I) pro- 
cess. Second, the coefficients of (14) are deter- 
mined by the taste and technology parameters, 
y and pl  , and must obey special restrictions. 
Yet (14) has much the same qualitative implica- 
tions for output and price behavior as (15). This 
is so, even though they have potentially different 
qualitative implications for the response of 
employment to supply shocks. 
In order to complete the model, specifications 
of aggregate demand and monetary policy are 
needed. Let aggregate demand be given by the 
quantity theory equation, as 
where m is the (log of the) quantity of money 
and v is the (log of the) velocity of money. As 
indicated, velocity, vt ,  is a stochastic first-order 
autoregression, whose innovation, A,, is nor- 
mally distributed with variance a): . 
The money stock can be chosen by the poli- 
cymaker in light of his assumed information 
about the state of the economy. The rule for 
monetary policy is specified as 
where the pi are choice parameters. The policy 
rule's arguments in E, -,  z, -  and Et -,  vt - , rep- 
resent money responses to an infinite series of 
past innovations realized in periods t - 2 and 
earlier. This specification of monetary policy is 
sufficient to satisfy output- or price-stabilization 
objectives, for example, to minimize the variance 
of either y or p. The policy rule parameters, p ,  , 
p,,  p4,  and p5  help determine output behavior; 
p3  and p6 do not influence output, but do 
influence the behavior of the price level. 
The final-form solutions for economy-wide 
averages of output, employment, and the real- 
wage are 
p2+  p5  At-  and  +  (1 + P4  )Ar+ - 
2 - Y 
- (1 - Y)(P, + /J5) 
2 - Y 
At- 1, 
where J=  [I  + Pl(l - y)] -I. 
IV.  Determinants of  Real- 
Wage Cyclicity 
Whether or not real wages are procyclical (posi- 
tively correlated with output and employment) 
depends upon the relative size of productivity 
2  versus velocity innovations (at versus ah ),  upon 
their autocorrelations (p, , p2 ), upon the elastic- 
ity of notional labor supply with respect to the 
real wage (Dl ), upon the elasticity of produc- 
tion with respect to labor input (y), and upon 
the policy rule (the pis  ).  In this section, some 
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wage cyclicity on these elements provide a 
robust basis for the view that procyclical or 
acyclical real wages are consistent with sticky 
nominal wages. 
Consider a simple, benchmark example in 
which the money supply is constant (pi  = 0, 
i = 1,2  ...  6) and notional labor supply is inelastic 
(p,  = 0). In this case, the final forms for 
economy-wide averages of output (y ), employ- 
ment ( n ), and the real wage ( w - p ) are 
(henceforth ignoring constant, or intercept 
terms): 
The correlation between output and the real 
wage can be either positive or negative in this 
example, depending on the relative importance 
of contrw tendencies. Productivity innovations 
have positive effects on output and real wages, 
tending to create a positive correlation between 
them. Contrariwise, demand shocks have posi- 
tive effects on output, but negative effects on real 
wages, tending to create a negative correlation. 
The benchmark example provides a plausible 
illustration of how sticky wages are consistent 
with either a positive or negative correlation 
between real wages and output. 
The example fails to provide an illustration of 
how real wages and employment could be posi- 
tively correlated. This is because employment, 
unlike output, is unaffected by the productivity 
shocks, as may be seen in the absence of  E-terms 
in (22). The reason productivity increases do not 
lead to employment increases is that productivity 
increases also lead to identical increases in the 
real wage, leaving firms' labor demand un- 
changed.  A one-unit rise in productivity raises out- 
put by one unit at the unchanging-employment 
level, which-given the unitary elasticity of 
demand inherent in the velocity equation-leads 
to a one-unit fall in the price level. Thus, margi- 
nal labor productivity and the real wage both 
rise by one unit, leaving the profit-maximizing 
employment level unchanged. After old contracts 
expire, there will be no adjustments to make to 
the nominal wage, since the real wage is not 
driven out of equality with labor productivity by 
productivity shocks, and workers are satisfied 
with supplying the unchanged employment level 
(which would not be the case if notional labor 
supply were elastic, or pl>O). 
The correlation between the real wage and 
employment is necessarily negative in the 
benchmark case, reflecting the effects of demand 
shocks. If  the real-wage puzzle is to be fully 
resolved, employment must respond positively 
to productivity shocks. 
At least four modifications of  the simple 
benchmark case can provide for positive employ- 
ment effects of productivity shocks. All seem to 
be reasonable features of the world rather than 
ad hoc contrivances. These modifications allow 
for (1) notional labor-supply elasticity, P,>O;  (2) 
monetary policy feedback, pi  # 0; (3) nonuni- 
tary elasticity of demand with respect to price; 
and (4) less-than-complete,  unilateral discretion 
by the firm in choosing employment levels. 
First, allow for a positive notional labor-supply 
elasticity. This modification means that renego- 
tiating wage contractors will aim for less increase 
in the real wage following a productivity innova- 
tion, in order to provide for a higher expected 
level of employment-one matching the higher 
notional labor supply induced by the higher 
expected real wage. This means that, while the 
nominal wage will be reduced under a new con- 
tract, it will not fall by as much as the price level 
falls. After this modification, the final-form solu- 
tion for employment is 
which shows the positive delayed effect of a 
productivity shock on employment if p,>O. The 
E  - ,-term reflects positive employment 
responses of the first group of firms to renego- 
tiate (reduce) nominal wages; the E  -  -terms for 
j > 0 reflect responses by both groups. The 
initial impact, dnt /d  E~,  remains at zero because 
the effect of labor supply elasticity occurs only 
through renegotiations of nominal wages, which 
occur with a lag. In spite of this delay, allowing 
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employment effects of productivity shocks and 
thus makes possible a positive correlation 
between the real wage and employment. 
Second, allow for monetary policy responses 
to shocks. The effect of this modification will 
depend on the kind of policy feedback intro- 
duced. The most plausible case would involve 
negative responses to demand, p4<0, p5<0, 
p60,  and positive responses to productivity, 
p,>O,  p>O,  p20.  Such responses could be 
motivated by a price-stabilization objective, or by 
a desire to alleviate the output- and employment- 
distorting influence of sticky wages. The object 
and effect of such a policy is to offset or elimi- 
nate demand shocks from the determination of 
employment and output, and to encourage 
employment and output to expand and contract 
to more fully reflect positive and negative pro- 
ductivity shocks. Objective-seeking monetary 
policy thus tends to reinforce the importance of 
productivity relative to demand shocks and to 
encourage positive employment responses to 
productivity shocks, tipping the scales toward a 
positive correlation between real wages and 
both output and employment. 
Interestingly, if  policy sought to totally elimi- 
nate the effects of a sticky wage, it could do so 
by setting the p  appropriately.14  Then, a 
demand shock would have no impact, the real 
wage would definitely be positively correlated 
with both employment and output (assuming 
p,>O),  and the economy would behave as if the 
sticky wage was not a problem because the labor 
market would always clear. 
Third, allow for nonunitary elasticity of aggre- 
gate demand. This modification makes the 
income velocity of money vary to cushion the 
effect of either shock on the price level. By 
reducing the deflationary consequence of a posi- 
14  Note that by assumption (to), the real labor demand condition is 
always satisfied. So  the monetary authority can get the labw market to clear 
each period by choosing a policy wle that keeps the employment-real-wage 
relation on the notional labor supply schedule. This policy is given by 
with p3 and pg irrelevant. Then, assuming notional labw supply has a posr- 
tive response to the real wage, the real wage is necessarily procyclical, mea- 
sured against either employment or  output. If policy sought to eliminate the 
familiar Harberger  welfare-loss triangles due to sticky wages, then sticky 
wages would not imply countercyclical real  wages. Ironically, such a policy 
would conceal the potential importance of  the sticky wage, and thus conceal 
the usefulness of  active policy feedback. 
tive productivity shock, the modification moder- 
ates the real-wage increase accompanying such a 
shock, encouraging a positive employment 
response during the contract interval. One way 
to implement the modification is to substitute 
the IS-LM apparatus for the simple velocity equa- 
tion, but the resulting model's complexity 
requires a separate treatment. 
Fourth, allow for the degree of discretion over 
employment exercised by a firm to be less than 
complete. Keynes and other Keynesians have 
built sticky-wage models that assume that an 
employer always chooses employment to equate 
real wages with marginal labor productivity. 
While analytically convenient, such an assump- 
tion is both extreme and unnecessary to give an 
important role to a sticky wage. It is extreme 
because it implies that employment bears no 
neccesary relation to its market-clearing or 
Pareto-optimal level. A more moderate approach 
is to allow employment decisions to reflect both 
the optimal employment level and the one-sided 
discretionary profit-maximizing employment 
level. One artifice for doing so is to let employ- 
ment decisions by firms be a weighted average 
of the market-clearing employment level and the 
demand at the fured nominal wage. Formally, 
replace (10)  nit =  nd
i, with 
where n;t is the market-clearing level of 
employment. The lower the degree of firm dis- 
cretion, 4, the less important are sticky wages in 
determining economic outcomes. Just as in the 
case of monetary policy feedback, this modifica- 
tion blunts the empirical impact of demand 
shocks and increases the employment and out- 
put responses to productivity shocks, increasing 
the correlation of the real wage with employ- 
ment and output. 
V.  A  Numerical  Example 
of  Procyclical  Real  Wages 
A numerical simulation provides an example of 
procyclical real wages under nominal contracts. 
The commodity supply equation is (13), pre- 
serving the traditional Keynesian assumption of 
equality of the real wage and marginal labor pro- 
ductivity. The demand equation is (16), preserv- 
ing the unitary elasticity of demand with respect 
to price. The parameter values assigned are 
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lar values for the feedback parameters were one- 
half the values required to completely stabilize 
the price level. (Choice of the values that com- 
pletely stabilize prices would have resulted in an 
implausible simulation, and one whose numeri- 
cal results would have been uninteresting: the 
effect of demand shocks on output, employ- 
ment, and the real wage would have been com- 
pletely removed, resulting in a positive correla- 
tion between output, employment, and the real 
wage of nearly 1.) The policy parameters 
assumed in the simulation are 
The example modifies the benchmark exam- 
ple in two ways: notional labor supply has posi- 
tive elasticity PI  = .5, and the money-supply rule 
provides a positive response to a productivity 
shock and a negative response to a demand 
shock. The final-form equations for aggregate 
output, employment, and the real wage are 
The two modifications to the benchmark spec- 
ification are sufficient to generate positive cycli- 
city in the real wage: the correlation between 
output and the real wage is +.67;  between 
employment and the real wage, +.15. Positive 
correlations arise even though the variance of 
the demand shock is five times as great as the 
variance of the productivity shock, and even 
though demand shocks actually account for a 
slightly larger portion of the variance in 
employment than do productivity shocks. 
Incidentally, measured productivity or total 
productivity of labor, y, - n, ,  has the same cycli- 
cal behavior as the real wage, so that the procy- 
clicity of measured productivity of the postwar 
U.S. economy can also be accounted for by the 
sticky-wage model. 
The numerical simulation provides an 
implausibly high correlation between output and 
the real wage, which is ironic in view of the puz- 
zle it was designed to resolve. The correlation 
can easily be reduced by changing the relative 
size of the disturbance variances or by other 
adjustments in free parameters. However, it is 
difficult to reduce the correlation between out- 
put and the real wage to realistic levels without 
making the correlation between employment 
and the real wage negative, unless more funda- 
mental changes in the model are made. Addition 
to the model of some elements of price sticki- 
ness, partial indexation of wages to the price 
level, and other features of a complete macro- 
economic theory might help make a sticky-wage 
model capable of accounting even more closely 
for the stylized facts of the business cycle. Such 
an effort, while indicated, goes beyond the 
scope of the present article. 
VI.  Conclusion 
The analysis has shown that introduction of pro- 
ductivity factors into the determination of wages 
and employment permits sticky-wage models to 
generate positive cyclicity in the real wage. 
Hence, the notion of the sticky wage cannot be 
rejected on grounds that it is inconsistent with a 
procyclical real wage. By  the same token, the 
analysis suggests that allowance for autonomous 
cyclical variations in labor productivity and 
forward-looking expectations are very useful in 
resolving the real-wage puzzle, and may point 
out the incompleteness of simple sticky-wage 
models lacking these features. This incomplete- 
ness can be remedied without reducing the use- 
fulness of the sticky-wage notion. While the sticky 
wage cannot alone explain or account for an 
observed procyclical real wage, the usefulness of 
sticky-wage models has always been seen else- 
where, specifically in understanding the effect of 
nominal variables, like money and prices, on 
real variables, such as output and employment. 
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